Have Gavel, Will Travel:
Dispute Resolution’s Innocents Abroad

Christopher Honeyman and Sandra Cheldelin/1

This article was originally published in Conflict Resolution Quarterly, Spring 2002. 
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The Theory to Practice Project, a significant Hewlett Foundation-funded effort, seeks to build better discussions and working relationships between scholars and practitioners in dispute resolution. The faculty of George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) is a leading group of scholars (theorists, researchers and practitioners) in the field. ICAR is also a Hewlett-funded Theory Center.2 In February 2000, we jointly organized a working dinner to discuss what we perceived to be an emerging problem. The model for the discussion was the type of informal but hard-thinking meeting that Theory to Practice had evolved under the heading of a “moveable feast.”3 The discussion’s slightly satirical title was “Have Gavel, Will Travel: Dispute Resolution’s Innocents Abroad.”

Background
An increasing number of United States-based conflict resolution providers and educators are now also working outside the country, carrying with them, in some sense, the mantle of “dispute (or conflict) resolution expert.” Examples are found in all segments, including government (e.g. the new International and Dispute Resolution section of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services), education (e.g. ICAR faculty with projects in countries including Rwanda, Columbia, Georgia, and the Ukraine), and individual private practitioners (e.g. the Mennonite Conciliation Service, a network of individuals committed to transforming conflict;) or the Network of Communities for Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (formerly the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution.)

A number of factors have precipitated this phenomenon. Many domestic-based NGOs have expanded their missions and services to include international disputes. Globalization has also affected the way we think about our work and its changing boundaries; geography no longer seems such a defining characteristic of problems of environmental disputes, corporate conflicts, or even warring nations with identity-based conflicts. The rise of terrorism is also not limited to a particular place. Professionals may differ sharply in their approaches to constructing encounters abroad, depending partly on whether their source of expertise is a specialty in international conflict, in culture and race issues, or any of an array of other backgrounds in conflict resolution.

It is possible that some people—though genuine experts in a given area—may inadvertently cause harm to persons and parties for whose culture, language and/or circumstances the dispute resolution professional’s U.S.-based experience has left them inadequately prepared. Informal observation and stories we had heard from colleagues and parties suggested that there are certain features of cross-cultural conflict intervention that prove to be problematic. But there was and is every reason to believe that conflict resolvers are likely to continue outsourcing their skills and knowledge. The combination pointed towards a need for an exploration.

The format for discussion chosen for this endeavor is called a “moveable feast,” and consists of

“…an informal working meeting…to which only experts are invited, at which many points of view are represented, and that produces a tightly focused product, fast… The idea is to create an informal atmosphere that encourages frank, honest, open discussions among attendees.”4

While it is never wise to expect too much from a short encounter, our past experience in Theory to Practice “moveable feasts” on other topics has demonstrated that the right group can often get farther in a few hours than one might think. Although a full set of “protocols” was too ambitious a goal for so short a dialogue, a tentative list of “Do’s and Don’ts” for practitioners abroad seemed within reach. This paper describes that tentative list, as created by the 17 people who participated in the discussion. The participants were scholars and practitioners in the greater Washington, D.C. metropolitan area with substantial experience of taking their work out of the United States. They did not share any particular background—some were practitioners, some academics, while their professional orientations included diplomacy, jurisprudence, journalism, sociology, labor relations, anthropology, and other disciplines and practical experiences. Many have received external funding from such sources as USIP, the Hewlett Foundation, the State Department, and USIA. Some have received small grants from private foundations. All are committed to reflection on and integration of theory and practice. As in previous “moveable feasts,” most of the time was spent in small groups, to which participants were assigned so as to ensure diversity of background. (We are indebted to the three rapporteurs who summarized these discussions.)

Despite the variety of backgrounds, we quickly found ourselves in general agreement on a number of points. A relatively brief and preliminary discussion does not seem appropriately depicted by a ponderous and weighty paper, so we will “cut to the chase,” presenting the group’s tentative conclusions as well as a brief discussion of the reasoning that led up to them. We invite readers to expand and improve on both.

Avoiding harm

The group strongly agreed that practitioners should consider the Hippocratic tenet “First, do no harm” as a guiding ethic. Complicating the practice of this principle, however, is that being invited to speak or work abroad can result in the feeling that tangible results must be produced, stated or implied goals must be accomplished or even that there is just a pervasive feeling, as certain participants stated it, that “we’d better do something.” Like most professionals in the field, those working abroad feel obligated to be helpful. This psychological dimension can render us offering services beyond which we are capable of adequately delivering.

More dangerous still, language difficulties (and sometimes, near-desperation of their circumstances) can easily result in the audience hearing something different and rather more sweeping than the speaker thought she or he was saying. We already know how difficult it is to communicate how we make meaning of a situation. Add to that the complication of language translation, and the result can come out quite different than we intended.5

Thus, achieving even this modest goal of avoiding harm seems to require multiple points of attention. The group felt that practitioners should work in multi-disciplinary teams, to bring a diverse set of experiences and substantive areas of knowledge to the project. Practitioners should also have substantive knowledge of the conflicts in which they are going to intervene. At least among members of a team, knowledge of the relevant languages, histories, and cultures is nearly essential. Individuals working abroad long-term should have language skills and knowledge of the culture and region, as well as conflict resolution and basic management problem-solving skills. Also important to a team intervening from outside is what Susan Collin Marks termed the X Factor. Though difficult to define, it begins with a general spirit and attitude of goodwill. Goodwill by itself, however, is far from enough. Another definition of the X Factor was offered by Christopher Mitchell and John Wagner:6 A practical and visible kind of respect, evidenced by such behavior as subjecting oneself to the long train rides that locals must take because their budgets may not allow air travel. More generally, practitioners should take the time to learn what others who came before them have done—and how those who live there have received it.

Practitioners should avoid doing “parachute” trainings or interventions. The group agreed that short-term involvement with a conflict, e.g. without a substantive commitment, is normally bad practice. This is a significant enough point that perhaps it should be considered part of a set of professional ethics for doing international conflict resolution work. Building long-term relationships is the only way to be sure that you are avoiding harm. If that means you only work in one country other than your home country all your life, so be it. Someone else can build up expertise and credibility in the next country over.

This last theme led to two observations which challenge conventional assumptions. It is customary to assume that practitioners are likely to take more practical approaches than academics, but one scholar-participant noted that the different work lives and different economic assumptions of practitioners and academics can sometimes allow academics more leeway in taking the time needed for these interventions ultimately to succeed: “As an academic, I have more time for a project than those who have (demanding) funders.” Another observation challenges the notion of disinterestedness as the core of “neutrality:” A participant whose daughter lives in the primary country where that participant spends most of her effort remarked “It helps to have a commitment to a friendship. I’m more effective because I’ve developed friendships in the countries where I work.”

There is an off-setting advantage that applies to cases managed by practitioners, as opposed to academics—in particular repeat player practitioners concerned with their reputations. This is that practitioners—including nonprofit agencies—who intend to make a living working on a particular type of dispute or in a particular area lose many more “points” for each bad-experience-story they generate than they gain from each good-experience-story. This could make repeat players a bit more willing to put in an extra effort than one-time players from either the academic or practice sphere.7

The group agreed that a pure dichotomy between practitioner and academic is artificial, although there is generally a significant gap. Both scholars and practitioners felt that “inappropriate export” of models is not just a practitioner’s error but that “people who write theory are often blinded to the context of practice.” One practitioner, heavily engaged in South Africa, commented on the difficulty of using theory in practice there: “The certainty of theory gave way to the uncertainty of practice.” There was general agreement that good theory needs to be grounded in practice; this supported the “scholarship of engagement” to which many of those present had found their way.

If this initial list daunts anyone from venturing to offer advice in far-flung circumstances, that is consistent with its aims: If you start feeling that you don’t know what you’re doing there, you’re likely to be right! But it is, in fact, possible for a reasonably talented and experienced person to offer real assistance. The next section will give some hints as to the positive side of the helpful/harmful equation.

Being prepared to adapt (or abandon) domestic models
Participants agreed that the domestic models of conflict resolution which we use often need to be adapted if used in other contexts and cultures. By domestic models, we are mostly considering the most common systems of conflict resolution in use in the United States. These include family mediation, generally performed by a professional practitioner in the U.S.; community mediation, generally performed by trained volunteers; court-based mediation and arbitration, generally performed by attorneys; and so on.) Who does what, let alone how it is done, may need to be quite different in another country.

Practitioners should try to be elicitive in redesigning their process models and in redefining their role as intervenors. (John Paul Lederach8 has written extensively on the elicitive process, as have practitioners of the Mennonite Conciliation Service.9) One participant remarked that in response to this need, grant writers in his organization had become experts at including time to become engaged in the recipient community. But even before going, practitioners must take time to prepare:

“You have to go in receptively; be able to recognize that those you are dealing with have points of view; and be able to discern and work with those points of view.”

What followed was a conversation that led down several paths, including that there are multiple modes; that sometimes it works to partner with an NGO and sometimes it does not; and that different projects require different methods. Yet the group agreed that as a general rule, we need to partner with local organizations and individuals.

The goal of partnering should be to provide support and training while the host/client should be working to become self-sufficient. While the group concurred on the main points, there were a significant number of individual perspectives—for example:

“Partners means equals. There is no word for it in Spanish.”

“The helper who goes in and says, “Let’s work this out together” won’t be well received. If you are going in as the expert, you have to provide some expertise.” (Note: at the same time, everyone agreed that “experts” must avoid using jargon, which fails to communicate clearly even in their own language.)

“Do your homework on the NGOs. Even universities aren’t necessarily non-interested parties. Only angels are neutrals.”

One participant argued:

“As much as possible, use local people to do the project; use local skills, value local skills. For example, I use local people to conduct interviews when doing a survey.”

But a clear difficulty with this was noted by another:

“The problem is, this creates differential rewards. If you pay them the same as their western counterparts, they’ll be millionaires in their own country. But if you pay them less, you’re not really partners.”

Another participant raised a related point:

“It’s about control of resources. Control of resources is a power position. They won’t give up control.” (We note in retrospect, however, that while the speaker was referring to locals, the comment is equally valid if applied to westerners.)

Finally, our varied contributors converged on a point of skepticism about certain local groups:

“Don’t get involved with dispute resolution groupies, which now exist everywhere. Many lack skills; others will see your project primarily as a source of revenue.”

Several conclusions emerged concerning the fact that intervenors often arrive with considerable ignorance as to “what else is going on” that might impact their efforts. In order to avoid being blind-sided, the following seems a minimum list. To begin, you need to have, if not a stamp of approval from authorities in countries where you work, at least a way of showing that you have let them know of your activities.

Then, a bit of self-restraint: Track 2 diplomacy should never cross into Track 1. Instead, it should help set up conditions that make formal negotiations and regularized relationships possible.

Adapting our concepts of “progress” to others’ problem-solving styles emerged as a significant problem. The group acknowledged that problem-solving isn’t necessarily linear in many places:

“You have to follow their mode of thinking, find their logical thread. The process of working in another culture is more often a circuitous dance. But as providers we must “produce,” finish the task.”

This, of course, often creates a tension which is not easily resolved.

There was significant conversation about financial support. Participants agreed that although resources are essential to do our work,

“…you need to have a vision, and not be funder-driven.”

Also, we collectively need to educate the funders about needs and possible useful activities, while funders should work at knowing the areas and conflicts in which they are funding conflict resolution activities. In this vein, several frustrations about typical funders emerged:

“The problem is that funders create short-term projects.”

“The funders won’t negotiate the terms of a job. It’s all results driven, too. For every project, you must evaluate it—e.g. ‘Did it produce specified results within a year?’”

“Evaluation when you’re building processes is a contradiction and there seems to be nothing anyone can do about it.”

On the other hand, a number of those present agreed that properly conducted evaluation is essential. Participants believe that a precursor of proper evaluation is that funders enlist a diverse set of knowledges and experience in advance, to be able to help design and support well-rounded conflict resolution projects:

“It’s very difficult, whether working in other cultures or our own, to get anyone really to define the goals of a project. Without defining immediate goals as well as the underlying purpose, you can’t tell whether the project has been successful.”

The group also believes that funding organizations can better shape the design of, and support for, conflict resolution projects if they themselves have substantive knowledge of conflict resolution theory and of the particular conflict.

The evening concluded with some collective advice for those who invite us in, and provide us the opportunity to do the kind of work in which we passionately believe: Have patience; all this work takes time. But avoid the temptation to allow those who are paying the intervenors’ bill to “call the tune.” You need to establish what’s important. And finally, you will have to be skeptical of claims of expertise. Do thorough reference checks on people and organizations who are proposing to work in your community. It’s your community, and you are the ones who have to live there after the intervenor leaves.

A baker’s dozen “bottom lines”
Rather than conclude this paper with summary remarks, we decided to follow our colleagues’ advice to provide a concise list—not in order of importance—that captures much of the evening’s discussion. We have therefore asked the publisher to print this list in very small type, suitable for printing on a pocket card; we’ve sometimes found very experienced people using this device as a way of reminding themselves, at moments of pressure or doubt, of others’ collected wisdom.

We confess that some of our colleagues’ “bottom lines” seem contradictory: When venturing into the traditional domain of diplomats, it hardly comes as a surprise that one of the diplomat’s traditional strengths—the making of fine and cautious judgments in ambiguous situations—is called for over and over again.

• Do your homework—and that does not mean just an Internet search
• Don’t parachute in—and seek to work yourself out of a job
• Be prepared for the dance
• Be aware of various points of view
• Trust your instincts
• Conspicuously demonstrate respect; it helps build trust
• Listen
• Avoid becoming a source of goodies
• Work with local organizations
• Be flexible; some tools work in some places; some don’t
• As part of your preparation, learn what has gone before you.
• Define your objectives and get the client to define theirs
• Use local people as much as possible.

NOTES

1. Fifteen other colleagues attended the “Moveable Feast” that contributed to this report. They are faculty and practitioners of conflict resolution in the greater Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.

2. The Hewlett Theory Centers are the 18 academic institutions funded by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation to strengthen the “conceptual framework” of the conflict resolution field. (see Bush, R.B., Report on the Assessment of the Hewlett Foundation’s Centers for “Theory Building” on Conflict Resolution, online at www.hewlett.org)

3. See Honeyman, C. “ADR Practitioners and Researchers in a ‘Moveable Feast.’” Alternatives to the High Costs of Litigation, June 1999.

4. Honeyman, C., McAdoo, B., and Welsh, N. “Here there be Monsters: At the edge of the map of conflict resolution,” p. 16. In The Conflict Resolution Practitioner (2001, Office of Dispute Resolution, Georgia State Courts.

5. The classic example, of course, is the translator’s error by which an offhand and laconic remark by Nikita Khrushchev, apparently intended as the equivalent of “we will be present at your burial,” became rendered as the far more pugnacious “we will bury you” — and thereby became a defining moment of the Cold War. See Melby, A.K. “Why Can’t a Computer Translate More like a Person?” (1995 Barker Lecture in Linguistics, Brigham Young U.)

6. Susan Collin Marks is Co-President of Search for Common Ground, a Washington, D.C.-based NGO. Christopher Mitchell, is the Drucie French/Steve Cumbie endowed Chair and Professor of Conflict Resolution at ICAR. John Wagner is Commissioner, International and Dispute Resolution Services at the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and Chair of ICAR’s advisory board. All were participants in the moveable feast.

7. For an illustration of what could happen if an ambitious scholar does not see himself or herself as a repeat player with the same setting, see Honeyman, C., McAdoo, B., and Welsh, N. “Here there be Monsters: At the edge of the map of conflict resolution,” pp. 5-7. In The Conflict Resolution Practitioner (2001, Office of Dispute Resolution, Georgia State Courts.)

8. Lederach, John Paul. Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995. Chapter 6, on an elicitive approach to training development, is especially helpful.

9. See Mediation and Facilitation Training Manual: Foundations and Skills for Constructive Conflict Transformation, 4th edition, Mennonite Conciliation Service, Akron, Pennsylvania, 2000.

Christopher Honeyman is president of Convenor, a dispute resolution consulting firm based in Madison, Wisconsin, and is director of the Theory to Practice Project, a Hewlett Foundation-funded national effort to improve communication between practitioners and scholars of conflict resolution.

Sandra Cheldelin is Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University. She has served as director of the Institute; on the faculty and as provost at the McGregor School of Antioch University, Yellow Springs, Ohio; on the faculty and as academic dean at the California School of Professional Psychology in Berkeley; and on the faculty and as director of education, development and research at the medical school at Ohio University.